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Abstract
Background In many market settings individuals are encouraged to switch health care providers as a means of ensuring more 
competition. Switching may have a potentially undesirable side effect of increasing unnecessary treatment. Focusing on the 
most common source of medical radiation (dental X-rays), the purpose of this study was to assess whether, upon switching 
dentist, X-ray exposure increases depending on the type of provider payment.
Methods The analysis used longitudinal data from 2005 to 2016 covering a 5% random sample of the Scottish adult popu-
lation covered by the National Health Service (NHS). Multiple fixed-effects panel regression analyses were employed to 
determine the correlation of provider remuneration with patients’ likelihood of receiving an X-ray upon switching to a new 
dentist other things equal. A broad set of covariates including a patient’s copayment status was controlled for.
Results Upon switching to a dentist who was paid fee-for-service, patients had a by 9.6%-points (95% CI 7.4–11.8%) higher 
probability of receiving an X-ray, compared to switching to a salaried dentist. Results were robust when accounting for 
patient exemption status, as well as unobserved patient and dentist characteristics.
Conclusions In comparison to staying with the same dentist, patients may be exposed to substantially more X-rays upon 
switching to a dentist who is paid fee-for-service. There may need to be better guidance and regulation to protect the health 
of those who have to switch provider due to moving and greater caution in advocating voluntary switching.
Keywords Financial incentives · Patient safety · Provider remuneration · Health care quality improvement
Background
Choice of health care provider is often dictated by loca-
tion. People who move over large distances have to switch 
provider. In addition health care systems have increasingly 
seen the introduction of market mechanisms [1,  2] in which 
switching of providers is encouraged [3] as a means of 
improving competition. Contact with a new patient is an 
opportunity to offer treatment and so a potentially undesir-
able medical side effects of patient switching is excessive 
treatment. It is well-established that some types of provider 
remuneration such as fee-for-service [4], increase the pro-
pensity to treat leading for calls for it to be replaced or regu-
lated. Where a treatment is potentially harmful this implies 
that there might be a risk to a patient who is either forced 
to or chooses to switch provider. To this end, we examine 
whether patients are exposed to additional ionizing radiation 
upon switching between dentists under different provider 
payment schemes. We exploit large-volume individual-
level administrative data and the unique characteristics of 
the most frequently applied type of medical imaging: dental 
X-rays. We focus on variations in the use of dental radio-
graphs when patients switch between providers who receive 
either fee-for-service or salary payments.
Medical radiography is associated with a radiation risk 
for patients. While X-rays serve a crucial role in diagnostics, 
radiation exposure is a well-known human carcinogen [5]. 
Dental X-rays are among the most used medical radiographs 
and the most common source of artificial radiation exposure 
[6]. Current clinical guidelines in many countries confirm that 
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dental radiographs should only be used if the patient’s benefits 
exceed the risks that is only upon strict clinical indication [7]. 
Nonetheless, the procedure is frequently delivered as part of 
a routine examination, especially when visiting a dentist for 
the first time. There is little evidence on the exact carcino-
genic effects of low dose radiation, such as caused by dental 
radiographs, because the sample sizes required to study them 
would need to be extremely large [8]. The consensus held by 
radiological protection organizations is based on the so-called 
linear no threshold (LNT) model, which postulates that risk of 
radiation induced cancer increases linearly with exposure and 
that there is no safe threshold [9]. Indeed, a number of studies 
have been able to show an association between dental X-rays 
and the risk for meningiomas and salivary tumors [6, 10, 11].
It has been established that health care providers adapt 
their behavior to financial incentives [12]. Ideally, financial 
rewards can be used to improve providers’ performance and 
the quality of services provided [13]. Empirical evidence, 
however, remains weak that these goals are easily achieved 
[14, 15]. Previous studies have found that the introduction 
of financial incentives has increased treatment intensity and 
created supplier induced demand. Evidence indicates that 
this often constitutes ineffective care with little effects on 
patient health, rather than a reduction of existing rationing 
[16].
Most of the existing literature on the topic has focused 
on general medicine, however, there is a growing body of 
evidence looking at dental care in particular [17, 18]. Studies 
show that financial incentives have the potential to increase 
utilization of dental check-ups [19] and increase the number 
of individuals under dentist supervision without a reduction 
in service quality [20]. However, remuneration schemes used 
for dentists can enable the provision of additional care with 
limited or no marginal benefits for patients [21] with poten-
tial adverse effects for patients [22]. Notably, fee-for-service 
payments have been shown to increase the probability of 
dental radiographs being provided to patients [23]. Ours is 
the first study to focus on the impact of switching dentist on 
this potentially harmful treatment.
Based on existing studies of the impact of fee-for-ser-
vice arrangements in general and for dentistry in particular, 
our hypotheses were that (i) patients receive significantly 
more dental radiographs upon switching to another dentist; 
and (ii) the effect on dental radiographs upon switching to 
another dentist is significantly larger under fee-for-service 
as compared to salary payment.
Methods
Institutional background
Dental care in Scotland is provided through a public–private 
mix. Public dental care is primarily delivered by the NHS 
General Dental Service. For the most part GDS is provided 
by private dentists that have arrangements with the NHS. 
They are being remunerated based on a mix of capitation 
and fee-for-service payments. The exact arrangements of 
the GDS reimbursements are detailed in the Statement of 
Dental Remuneration [24]. There are also a number of sala-
ried dentists that provide GDS in areas where independent 
private dentists did not meet local needs. Since 2014 these 
salaried dentists are part of the Public Dental Service (PDS), 
whose main responsibility is to provide GDS to patients that 
cannot access care from private dentists. In general patients 
receiving care under the GDS pay 80% of the treatment fees 
up to a certain limit out-of-pocket. However patients can be 
exempt from these charges for a number of different reasons 
[25]. The patient fee for a dental X-ray is independent of 
the dentist’s remuneration status. Private dentists are free to 
provide dental care to paying patients outside of the GDS. 
The fact that our data set does not include any information 
on these services should not cause problems for validity of 
the results. Our results would depict lower bound estimates, 
if X-rays are provided privately on a regular basis.
The guideline for oral health assessment published by 
the Scottish Dental Clinical Effectiveness Program (SDCEP) 
determines the situations in which dental radiographs should 
be taken as a diagnostic tool [26]. In particular the SDCEP 
determines that “routine ‘screening’ radiography (e.g., 
panoramic radiographs) must not be carried out and new 
radiographs must not be undertaken without first examining 
existing films or without clear justification”. In cases where 
radiographs are necessary, dentists should undertake all nec-
essary steps to minimize the need for further radiography.
Data
Our study is based on a data set originating from the GDS 
database, provided to us by the Information Services Divi-
sion (ISD) of NHS Scotland. The data were extracted from 
the Management Information and Dental Accounting Sys-
tem (MIDAS) that contains all treatment claims made under 
the GDS. ISD drew a random sample of 5% all individuals 
registered in the GDS in 2016 and tracked them back until 
2005. Our data set thus includes the full dental histories of 
all sampled individuals allowing us to conduct a panel analy-
sis. In total our data set contains 4,369,961 claimed services 
provided to 146,239 (around 2.7% patients by 4894 different 
dentists over the 11-year study period. Besides the detailed 
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information on dental claims, our data set included variables 
on various patient and dentist characteristics.
We collapsed the data onto the treatment band level for 
analysis. Treatment bands were defined as all treatments that 
were initiated on the same starting date, disregarding actual 
date of delivery and all accompanying treatments. The rea-
son for this choice is based on the GDS practice. When a 
patient visits a dentist, the latter develops a treatment plan 
(if necessary) that might include multiple follow-up visits. 
In the MIDAS database all these treatments are recorded as 
having the same start date. We only retained the treatment 
bands, where a patient visits a dentist for the first time during 
the study period and having received a dental X-ray during 
a previous treatment band by a different provider. Figure 1 
illustrates this exclusion process.
Outcomes and covariates
Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of the outcome 
variable and chosen covariates. The outcome variable for our 
analyses was the delivery of at least one dental X-ray (small 
dental film) to a patient during any given treatment band.
The main independent variable of interest is the den-
tists’ remuneration status. We also take into account the 
dentists’ experience. This is based on the date, the den-
tists first registered with the GDS. While dentists theoreti-
cally could already have practiced privately beforehand, 
we assume that for the vast majority, this represents their 
professional experience accurately. The time elapsed in 
between treatment bands is also controlled for. We expect 
that the longer that duration, the higher the probability of 
severe changes in dental health status, which would ren-
der the provision of dental radiographs recommended in 
accordance with the SDECP guidelines.
Patient characteristics that we controlled for include 
patient age and deprivation of the area of residence. 
The latter is based on the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Fig. 1  Sample selection process
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Deprivation that takes into account a number of socio-
economic characteristics across seven different domains 
[27]. The scores are applied to 6976 geographical areas of 
equal population. Additionally, we controlled for patients 
being exempt from co-payments, to check to the effect of 
patient financial incentives. Assuming that the gender of 
patients and dentists is constant over time, gender is taken 
account of by the fixed effects in our analytical approach 
(see below).
Analytical approach
This study adopts a previously established theoretical frame-
work concerning the role of financial incentives in relation to 
dental X-raying [23]. The framework takes into account that 
X-ray provision depends on the interaction between patients 
and dentists. In general, the probability of a dental radio-
graphic examination is dependent on the dentist and patient 
characteristics, the dentist’s remuneration scheme, the 
patient’s dental health status and the patient’s own financial 
contribution. If dentists act altruistically in the best interest 
of their patients, their reimbursement scheme should not be 
significantly associated with the probability of providing a 
dental radiograph.
This framework can be operationalized as a linear prob-
ability model [23]. While the binary outcome variable opens 
the possibility of using non-linear regression models, we 
chose to follow a linear approach for the practical reasons of 
computation speed and ease of interpretation of the regres-
sion coefficients. As we are interested in analyzing the cor-
relation of dentist reimbursement with X-ray provision, we 
have to confront the fact that, relying on observational data, 
reimbursement status is not randomly assigned, thus creat-
ing a possible endogeneity bias. We address this issue by 
exploiting the longitudinal nature and panel characteris-
tics of our data in a multiple fixed effects model. Through 
repeated observations of the same dentists and estimating 
dentist fixed effects to correct for unobserved heterogene-
ity, we can take into account the effect of changes in reim-
bursement status. Similarly, many patient characteristics are 
not contained in the data. To avoid biased results based on 
unobserved time-constant characteristics, we also estimate 
patient fixed effects.
We estimated the regression model for the sample of 
treatment bands, where patient visited a dentist for the 
first time and have previously received an X-ray during our 
study period. We are thereby able to estimate the effects of 
remuneration status on X-ray provision for new patients. 
As a control we also estimated the model for the overall 
sample of treatment bands. All calculations were carried 
out using Stata/SE 14.2 [28]; the two-way fixed effects 
estimations were carried out using the felsdvreg command.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our sam-
ple. Among the 399,115 treatments sessions where people 
visited a new dentist for the first time, 28.32% (113,010) 
included a dental X-ray. We observe a big difference 
between fee-for-service dentists 28.93% (106,567), com-
pared to the 20.93% (6443) of salaried dentists in terms of 
providing a dental X-ray during the first visit.
Our two-way fixed effects regression model (Table 3) 
confirms the substantial difference between salaried 
and fee-for-service dentists observed on the descriptive 
level. The probability of a salaried dentist providing an 
X-ray for a new patient is 9.6 percentage points (95% CI 
[− 0.118; − 0.074]) lower than for their fee-for-service 
peers. We find that a patient’s deprivation (−0.0045 
[− 0.0081; − 0.0011]) is negatively associated with the 
Table 1  Summary statistics: dependent and independent variables
N = 399,115 Description Mean [Std.Dev.]
X-ray Equals 1 if “small dental film” was claimed 28.32%
Deprivation Deprivation quintiles of patients’ residence




 5 (highest deprivation) 20.24%
Patient’s age Patient’s age in years 40.17 [19.77]
Patient’s exemption status Equals 1 if patient was exempt from payment for any reason
Months since last visit  Duration since previous treatment band was started (months) 12.23 [16.03]
Dentist’s experience  Years since dentist registered with the GDS 9.84 [10.24]
Dentist’s remuneration status  Equals 1 if dentist is salaried, 0 if dentist paid fee-for-service 7.71%
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probability of receiving an X-ray. A patient’s exemption 
status (− 0.066 [− 0.073; − 0.060]) is also negatively asso-
ciated with X-rays, meaning that exempt patients are less 
likely to receive one. A longer duration in between treat-
ment bands increased the likelihood of the patient receiv-
ing an X-ray (0.0039 [0.0037; 0.0039]). The effect of a 
dentist’s experience approaches 0 in the analysis. These 
results were stable when adjusting for year fixed effects 
(Table 4).
Discussion
Individuals move between health providers for a variety of 
reasons both non-discretionary and in response to encour-
agement to seek out better health care. This study shows that 
patients visiting a dentist for the first time are more likely to 
be X-rayed if the dentist is remunerated on a fee-for-service 
scheme, leading to potential excess radiation exposure. We 
focused on the association between reimbursement mecha-
nisms and dental radiograph frequency, which allows us to 
identify a difference in treatment that should not exist. This 
difference indicates potentially inequitable treatment based 
on provider remuneration leading to excess radiation expo-
sure or risk of under-treatment.
Dental radiographs are the most common form of artifi-
cial radiation exposure [6]. Clinical guidelines limit their use 
to situations, where the benefits outweigh the risks for the 
patients [26]. We confirm and add to the previous results that 
fee-for-service payments are associated with more dental 
radiographs [23] and show that the difference in frequency 
of X-ray provision is even more substantial during first time 
visits. Whilst dental radiographs are an indispensable diag-
nostic tool, limiting unnecessary X-rays should be among the 
goals of every health system. Based on the regression results 
presented in Table 3, and considering the care provided by 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
for study sample by dentist 
reimbursement status
N = 399,115 Fee-for-service dentists Salaried dentists







Exempt patients (in %) 38.8% 43.89%
Mean patient age in years [SD] 40.28 [15.83] 38.8 [20.74]
Mean months since last visit [SD] 12.02 [15.83] 14.82 [18.09]
Mean dentist’s experience in years [SD] 9.92 [10.28] 8.91 [9.64]
Table 3  Regression results: 
effects on dental X-raying
N = 399,115 Coefficient [95% confidence interval] Standard error (p value)
Dentist’s remuneration status  − 0.096 [− 0.118; − 0.074] 0.011 (< 0.000)
Deprivation  − 0.005 [− 0.008; − 0.001] 0.002 (0.01)
Patient’s age  − 0.0005 [− 0.002; 0.000] 0.001 (0.45)
Patient’s exemption status  − 0.066 [− 0.073; − 0.06] 0.003 (< 0.000)
Months since last visit 0.004 [0.0037; 0.0039] 0.00006 (< 0.000)
Dentist’s experience  − 0.0018 [− 0.0036; − 0.0000] 0.001 (0.04)
Table 4  Regression results: 
effects on dental X-raying with 
year fixed-effects
N = 399,115 Coefficient [95% confidence interval] Standard error (p value)
Dentist’s remuneration status  − 0.094 [− 0.12; − 0.076] 0.013 (< 0.000)
Deprivation  − 0.004 [− 0.008; − 0.001] 0.002 (0.02)
Patient’s age  − 0.0005 [− 0.003; 0.000] 0.001 (0.53)
Patient’s exemption status  − 0.069 [− 0.076; − 0.058] 0.002 (< 0.000)
Months since last visit 0.002 [0.0027; 0.0049] 0.0003 (< 0.000)
Dentist’s experience  − 0.0018 [− 0.0036; − 0.0000] 0.001 (0.04)
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salaried dentists as reference level, this would mean that 
switches to fee-for-service dentists during the observation 
period were correlated 38,315 dental X-rays in excess of 
switching to a salaried dentist. Accordingly, the estimated 
excess radiation exposure experienced by our study popula-
tion, relative to if dentists were paid on a fixed salary would 
amount to 11,495–827,604 µSv [29].
Patients in our study sample may have moved between 
dentists for a variety of reasons. One of them could be 
that there were differences in the quality of dental ser-
vices provided according to dentists’ remuneration status. 
Patients who chose a dentist who was paid fee-for-service 
may have done so because they believed this was the best 
dentist for them. In addition, the possibility to switch 
between dentists likely depends on the supply of dentists 
within an area. The data available for our study did not 
lend themselves to adjust our analyses for the quality of 
dental services or detailed geographic distribution of the 
dental workforce and this should be acknowledged as a 
limitation of our study.
This study has a number of implications for the regula-
tion and oversight of dental health care provision. It illus-
trates a continuing risk of fee-for-service arrangements in 
leading to excessive X-rays and identifies an at-risk group 
of patients—those that have to, or choose to, switch dentist 
and arrive at a fee-for-service provider. It also highlights 
a hitherto undocumented risk of encouraging patients to 
switch between providers. Whilst that encouragement 
might be beneficial in respect of improving the market for 
dental health care, it might also be placing patients at risk.
Conclusions
The provision of dental radiographs should be linked to 
clear benefits for the patients and not carried out as a rou-
tine treatment. Our findings indicate that patients visiting 
a dentist for the first time are more likely to receive a den-
tal radiograph, if that dentist is paid fee-for-service. This 
highlights that fee-for-service remuneration can potentially 
lead to adverse effects for patients. Furthermore, these 
adverse effects can be exacerbated through reforms that 
encourage patients to shop around for providers. When 
implementing such reforms to improve competition, the 
effects of financial incentives need to be considered.
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